[118], On the night of the fall of Lang Vei, three companies of the PAVN 101D Regiment moved into jump-off positions to attack Alpha-1, an outpost west of the Combat Base held by 66 men of Company A, 1st Platoon, 1/9 Marines. Khe Sanh was one of the most remote outposts in Vietnam, but by January 1968, even President Lyndon Johnson had taken a personal interest in the base. In an unconventional war without conventional frontlines, statistics became the most critical measure of progress. They produced a body count ratio in the range between 50:1 and 75:1. A secret memorandum reported by US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, sent to US President Lyndon B. Johnson on 19 February 1968, was declassified in 2005. [131], Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when Westmoreland ordered General John J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to prepare a contingency plan. After its adoption, Marine helicopters flew in 465 tons of supplies during February. In 1964 an Ohio woman took up the challenge that had led to Amelia Earharts disappearance. During the 66-day siege, U.S. planes, dropping 5,000 bombs daily, exploded the equivalent of five Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs in the area. The platoon withdrew following a three-hour battle that left six Marines dead, 24 missing, and one taken prisoner. The NVA 304th Divisions history notes that on 9 July 1968, the liberation flag was waving from the flag pole at Ta Con [Khe Sanh] airfield. On July 13, 1968, Ho Chi Minh sent a message to the soldiers of the Route 9Khe Sanh Front affirming our victory at Khe Sanh.. The Marines withdrew all salvageable material and destroyed everything else. The assault began on 10 May 1969 w ith the 101st Airborne Division and troops of the 9th M arine Regiment, the 5 th Cavalry Regiment, and the 3 rd ARVN Regiment. Two days later, US troops detected PAVN trenches running due north to within 25 m of the base perimeter. [80] Westmoreland had already ordered the nascent Igloo White operation to assist in the Marine defense. U.S. Marines and their allies killed thousands of NVA, but to solve the riddle of Khe Sanh, you have to recount the numbers. Lownds feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000, and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. Its mission was to destroy the Special Forces and their Vietnamese allies and to ambush any reinforcements coming from Khe Sanh. [152] The Marines occupied Hill 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971. The monumental Battle of Khe Sanh had begun, but the January 21 starting date is essentially arbitrary in terms of casualty reporting. The Marines fought long, hard and well at Khe Sanh, but they sacrificed in much greater numbers than has been acknowledged by official sources. [75], Niagara I was completed during the third week of January, and the next phase, Niagara II, was launched on the 21st,[76] the day of the first PAVN artillery barrage. The report, originally classified as secret, noted that intelligence from many sources indicated conclusively that the North Vietnamese had planned a massive ground attack against the base. [77] When weather conditions precluded FAC-directed strikes, the bombers were directed to their targets by either a Marine AN/TPQ-10 radar installation at KSCB or by Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stations. Westmoreland had been forwarding operational plans for an invasion of Laos since 1966. SOG Reconnaissance teams also reported finding tank tracks in the area surrounding Co Roc mountain. This is also the position taken in the official PAVN history but offers no further explanation of the strategy. Since the Marines on board were not yet officially attached to the 26th Marine Regiment, their deaths were not included in the official Khe Sanh count, nor were the several other deaths associated with aircraft crashes. Five Marines were killed on January 19 and 20, while on reconnaissance patrols. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the US Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division for the duration of Operation Pegasus. They asked what had changed in six months so that American commanders were willing to abandon Khe Sanh in July. Dien Bien Phu would loom large for the rest of the war, especially during the Battle of Khe Sanh. Listen Now. This is the battles end date from the North Vietnamese perspective. [62], On 20 January, La Thanh Ton, a PAVN lieutenant from the 325th Division, defected and laid out the plans for an entire series of PAVN attacks. They fixed the attention of the American command on the border regions, and they drew American and ARVN forces away from the coastal lowlands and cities in preparation for the Tet Offensive. The deaths of U.S. Air Force personnel, estimated between five and 20, are also omitted. Those 10 deaths were also left out of the official statistics. You could lose it and you really haven't lost a damn thing. Fighting around Khe Sanh was continuous. When an enemy rocket-propelled grenade killed 2nd Lt. Randall Yeary and Corporal Richard John, although these Marines died before the beginning of the siege, their deaths were included in the official statistics. The strike wounded two more Strike Force soldiers and damaged two bunkers. "[73], Nevertheless, ultimately the nuclear option was discounted by military planners. Senior Marine Corps General Victor Krulak agreed, noting on May 13 that the Marines had defeated the North Vietnamese and won the battle of Khe Sanh. Over time, these KIA figures have been accepted by historians. North Vietnamese Army gained control of the Khe Sanh region after the American withdrawal. On April 6, a front-page story in The New York Times declared that the siege of Khe Sanh had been lifted. [25], Marino stated that "by 1966, Westmoreland had begun to consider Khe Sanh as part of a larger strategy." After failing to respond to a challenge, they were fired upon and five were killed outright while the sixth, although wounded, escaped. [146] Useful equipment was withdrawn or destroyed, and personnel were evacuated. He has published over 20 books including: How to Survive Anything, Anywhere. Military History Institute of Vietnam, pp. [15], Unknown (1,602 bodies were counted, US official public estimated 10,00015,000 KIA,[19][20] but MACV's secret report estimated 5,550 killed as of 31 March 1968)[1]. [29], During the second half of 1967, the North Vietnamese instigated a series of actions in the border regions of South Vietnam. Naval aircrews, many of whom were redirected from Operation Rolling Thunder strikes against North Vietnam, flew 5,337 sorties and dropped 7,941 tons of ordnance in the area. Five days later, the final reinforcements arrived in the form of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion, which was deployed more for political than tactical reasons. [87], Heated debate arose among Westmoreland, Commandant of the Marine Corps Leonard F. Chapman Jr., and Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson. [125] On the night of 28 February, the combat base unleashed artillery and airstrikes on possible PAVN staging areas and routes of advance. [34] US intelligence estimated between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN troops were killed, and 362 members of the US 4th Infantry Division, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and ARVN Airborne elements were killed in action, but three of the four battalions of the 4th Infantry and the entire 173rd were rendered combat-ineffective during the battle. A single company replaced an entire battalion. The Marine defense of Khe Sanh, Operation Scotland, officially ended on March 31. Westmoreland was replaced two months after the end of the battle, and his successor explained the retreat in different ways. This caused problems for the Marine command, which possessed its own aviation squadrons that operated under their own close air support doctrine. As a result of this intelligence, KSCB was reinforced on 22 January 1968 by the 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment. Background [ edit] In 1966 the Marines built a base adjacent to the Army position, and organized their combat activities around named operations. Find many great new & used options and get the best deals for The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh by Murphy, Edward F. (mass_market) at the best online prices at eBay! [79] On an average day, 350 tactical fighter-bombers, 60 B-52s, and 30 light observation or reconnaissance aircraft operated in the skies near the base. For some unknown reason, the PAVN troops did not press their advantage and eliminate the pocket, instead throwing a steady stream of grenades at the Marines. The fighting was heavy. The United States and its South Vietnamese allies pulled many huge offensive . Even so, Westmoreland insisted for it not only to be occupied by the Marines but also for it to be reinforced. [82], By the end of the battle, USAF assets had flown 9,691 tactical sorties and dropped 14,223tons of bombs on targets within the Khe Sanh area. Soon after, another shell hit a cache of tear gas, which saturated the entire area. Of the 500 CIDG troops at Lang Vei, 200 had been killed or were missing and 75 more were wounded. Operation Scotland II continued until the end of the year, resulting in the deaths of 72 more Marines. The 26th Marines were activated in 1944 and fought in the Battle of Iwo Jima during World War II and were activated again on 1 March 1966, and fought in the Battle of Khe Sanh during the Vietnam War . The Battle of Khe Sanh took place between January 21 and July 9, 1968; however, most of the official statistics provided pertain only to Operation Scotland, which ended on March 31, or to the 77-day period beginning what is classified as the Siege of Khe Sanh, where the 26th Marines were pinned down until Operations Niagara, and Pegasus freed [28], In early December 1967, the PAVN appointed Major General Tran Quy Hai as the local commander for the actions around Khe Sanh, with Le Quang Do as his political commissar. The attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. One of the first enemy shells set off an explosion in the main ammunition dump. In fact, neither side won a resounding victory. Casualties were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending Marines lost two men. Due to the nature of these activities, and the threat that they posed to KSCB, Westmoreland ordered Operation Niagara I, an intense intelligence collection effort on PAVN activities in the vicinity of the Khe Sanh Valley. Home > Features > Battle of Khe Sanh > View All. The Marines were extremely reluctant to relinquish authority over their aircraft to an Air Force general. Army deaths at FOB-3, however, were not included in the official statistics either. The microwave/tropo site was located in an underground bunker next to the airstrip. With Khe Sanh facing a full-scale. Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, pp. "[24] In November 1964, the Special Forces moved their camp to the Xom Cham Plateau, the future site of Khe Sanh Combat Base. By the middle of January 1968, some 6,000 Marines and Army troops occupied the Khe Sanh Combat Base and its surrounding positions. [161], Whether the PAVN actually planned to capture Khe Sanh or the battle was an attempt to replicate the Vit Minh triumph against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu has long been a point of contention. The Marines at Khe Sanh Combat Base broke out of their perimeter and began attacking the North Vietnamese in the surrounding area. The next operations were named Crockett and Ardmore. by John Prados. [147] The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting, which had killed five more Marines. [108] The most dramatic supply delivery system used at Khe Sanh was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, in which palletized supplies were pulled out of the cargo bay of a low-flying transport aircraft by means of an attached parachute. An additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II as of the end of June 1968. Overnight, they were moved to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there, some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos. This time period does not particularly coincide with the fighting; rather, it dates from before the siege began and terminates before the siege (and the fighting) ended. Cushman was appalled by the "implication of a rescue or breaking of the siege by outside forces. The base was officially closed on July 5. At 04:15 on 8 February under cover of fog and a mortar barrage, the PAVN penetrated the perimeter, overrunning most of the position and pushing the remaining 30 defenders into the southwestern portion of the defenses. [41], To prevent PAVN observation of the main base at the airfield and their possible use as firebases, the hills of the surrounding Khe Sanh Valley had to be continuously occupied and defended by separate Marine elements. [110], As more infantry units had been assigned to defend KSCB, artillery reinforcement kept pace. If firepower determined the outcome of the fight, it was airlift that allowed the defenders to hold their positions. These were pitted against two to three divisional-size elements of the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). On June 19, 1968, another operation began at Khe Sanh, Operation Charlie, the final evacuation and destruction of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. The withdrawal of the last Marines under the cover of darkness was hampered by the shelling of a bridge along Route 9, which had to be repaired before the withdrawal could be completed. "[162] Those who agree with Westmoreland reason that no other explanation exists for Hanoi to commit so many forces to the area instead of deploying them for the Tet Offensive. [164] He cited the fact that it would have taken longer to dislodge the North Vietnamese at Hue if the PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there instead of dividing its forces. 3% were Asian, 7 or . [122] The majority of these were around the southern and southeastern corners of the perimeter, and formed part of a system that would be developed throughout the end of February and into March until they were ready to be used to launch an attack, providing cover for troops to advance to jumping-off points close to the perimeter. "[52], Brigadier General Lowell English (assistant commander 3rd Marine Division) complained that the defense of the isolated outpost was ludicrous: "When you're at Khe Sanh, you're not really anywhere.